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NOTES AND COMMENTS
STANDING TO RAISE FOURTH AMENDMENT
GUARANTEES AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: RAKAS V.
ILLINOIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rakas
v. Illinois' has dispelled impressions created by earlier decisions as to
the breadth of standing to assert a violation of the fourth amendment
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the wake of
Rakas, standing no longer is a distinctly separate inquiry in fourth
amendment analysis. With this decision the Court elects to treat a per-
son's ability to assert the fourth amendment guarantee as part of the
substantive question of whether that person's fourth amendment rights
were violated. Yet, Rakas represents more than a mere change in
fourth amendment methodology. The decision departs from earlier
cases which indicated that some degree of fourth amendment protec-
tion was due even the passenger in an automobile. Rakas represents a
break with earlier case law regarding the freedom from governmental
intrusion which a passenger is entitled to expect in the automobile in
which he is riding. In light of the Rakas decision, the passenger in a
private automobile has no right to demand reasonable governmental
action as to search of the vehicle in which he is riding.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts of the Case
Frank Rakas and Lonnie King were passengers in an automobile
driven and owned by one of their two female companions. Shortly
before Rakas and company were stopped by police, an armed robbery
had occurred in the vicinity. In this robbery two masked males had
escaped in a similar automobile. A police officer on patrol spotted the
car in which Rakas and the others were riding and followed it, initially
believing it to be the stolen getaway car. The officer soon realized the
car was a different color and had a different license number, but he
1. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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continued to follow. When the vehicle stopped at a lounge and its oc-
cupants went inside, the officer phoned in a description of the suspects
and was told one of the descriptions matched that of one of the robbers.
By radio the officer summoned assistance. After the suspects were
again in their car and on the highway they were stopped. All four oc-
cupants were removed from the car at gunpoint. Two officers then
searched the car with neither warrant nor consent and found rifle am-
munition in the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under
the front passenger seat. Rakas and King were arrested and subse-
quently charged with the robbery.2
Prior to trial in the Illinois state courts on armed robbery charges,
Rakas and King moved to suppress the rifle and ammunition seized in
the search of the vehicle.3 They argued that the seizure of those items
violated the fourth amendment. The Circuit Court of Kankakee
County, Illinois, denied a pre-trial motion to suppress this evidence.
The court reasoned that Rakas and King lacked standing to raise the
search and seizure question because they neither owned the car nor had
control over it.4 At trial the sawed-off rifle was identified by a victim of
the robbery as one of the weapons used by the masked robbers.- Rakas
and King were convicted of armed robbery.6
On appeal the Appellate Court of Illinois reiterated the view of the
trial court as to the standing issue and held that "without a proprietary
or other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein
lacks standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle."'7
After the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Rakas and
King petitioned for and were granted certiorari by the United States
2. Id at 130.
3. The text of the motion to suppress, as well as the record of the subsequent hearing on that
motion, is given in Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari at 4-24.
4. Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari at 23-24; Brief for Petitioners at 5-6. It can also be
argued that part of the grounds for denial of the motion was that petitioners had not asserted an
interest in the rifle and shells seized. The prosecutor in his oral motion to dismiss stated that no
such interest had been asserted. It is plain from the record that counsel for Rakas and King did
not feel it necessary to assert such an interest in order to contest the validity of the search. The
language of the trial judge speaks only to the petitioners' lack of interest in the car itself: "These
men have no standing to contest the validity of the search. It wasn't their car. They had no
control over it. The only person that could complain would be the one who was driving it at the
time or who owned the car." Id
5. Petition for Certiorari at 2.
6. 439 U.S. 129. The decision of the Illinois Appellate Court affirming the conviction is
reported at 46 IlM. App. 3d 569, 360 N.E.2d 1252 (1977). The standing issue was raised in this
appeal, but was not considered meritorious. Petition for Certiorari at 4.
7. 46 I. App. 3d 569, 571, 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1977).
[Vol. 15:85
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B. The Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
The issues presented by the defendants in their petition for certio-
rari were:
(1) whether passengers who are legitimately present in an auto-
mobile when it is stopped by police have standing to challenge the con-
stitutionality of a warrantless search of that automobile; and
(2) whether persons against whom a search is directed have
standing to contest the search independent of the other recognized cri-
teria for establishment of such standing.9
III. THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING PRIOR TO RAK_4S V ILLINOIS
The illegality of a search or seizure cannot be contested by every-
one. To determine whether a particular person is a proper party to
assert this illegality and claim the remedy of exclusion of the evidence
so obtained is to decide whether that person has "standing" to raise the
fourth amendment issues. To appreciate the Rakas decision, prior case
law must be examined to determine what attributes were earlier re-
quired for standing to raise a fourth amendment contention.' 0
A. Standing on the Promises of Jones
In the 1960 case of Jones v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court,
for the first time, scrutinized standing as it relates to searches and
seizures. 2 The Rakas defendants postulated two arguments to support
their standing to assert the constitutional guarantee. Both were
grounded in the language of Jones.
8. Rakas v. Illinois, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
9. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 2.
10. For a general history of the doctrine of standing as it relates to unreasonable searches and
seizures see Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471
(1952); Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 ARIz. L. REv. 65 (1964). A
recent, in-depth analysis of fourth amendment jurisprudence is provided in W. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE (1978), a three volume treatise.
11. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
12. The Court had encountered questions of standing in fourth amendment cases before
Jones but the issue was never extensively discussed. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925). Cases prior to Jones strictly keyed standing to the possessory or proprietary interest in the
property seized or the premises searched. If a defendant could show neither, he could not raise the
fourth amendment issue. See Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and
Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1, 35-36 n.238 (1975).
1979]
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Jones had been staying at a friend's apartment while the friend
was out of town. Federal agents executed a search warrant for narcot-
ics in the apartment while Jones was there. Narcotics were found and
Jones was arrested on charges relating to his possession. 13 Jones moved
to suppress the evidence of the apartment search on the ground that the
warrant had been defective. Suppression was denied. The govern-
ment's argument at the hearing on the motion was twofold: Jones had
been a mere guest in his friend's apartment and therefore had no pro-
prietary interest in the premises sufficient to have rendered him a "vic-
tim" of the search; in addition, Jones had vehemently denied
ownership of the seized narcotics and thus could not claim an interest
in them which would make him a victim of the seizure. Jones was con-
victed and the conviction was upheld by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. 4
Reversing the conviction of Jones, the Supreme Court expanded
fourth amendment standing by rejecting the standard which had been
followed by many lower courts.' 5 This standard was based on the sub-
tle distinctions of traditional property law.16 The Court recognized that
the fourth amendment was obviously designed for protection against
official invasion of privacy as well as for the security of property.' 7 It
therefore held that anyone "legitimately on [the] premises" had a suffi-
cient interest in the premises, the invasion of which would be a signifi-
cant injury giving rise to standing to object to a search of those
premises. 18
13. 362 U.S. at 258-59.
14. Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
15. 362 U.S. 257. The Jones opinion was written by Justice Frankfurter and subscribed to by
all nine members of the Court. Justice Douglas dissented as to the issue of probable cause to issue
the search warrant, but joined the Court's opinion as to the standing issue. Id at 273.
16. Under this standard followed by many lower courts, distinctions among categories such
as lessee, licensee, invitee, and guest determined the amount of fourth amendment protection
awarded an individual. Id at 266. Eg., Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(mere guest or invitee in apartment lacks required standing); Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d
47 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (defendant, guest in apartment, had no standing to contend entry and subse-
quent seizure were unlawful); Stieber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952) (lessee of
farm has requisite interest to contest search of premises); Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381
(D.C. Cir. 1945) (fourth amendment may be raised only by one who claims ownership in or right
to possession of the premises searched or property seized); Daddio v. United States, 125 F.2d 924
(2d Cir. 1942) (casual and temporary visitor or guest in home does not have standing to assert
unreasonable search of that home); United States v. DeBousi, 32 F.2d 902 (D. Mass. 1929) (lessee
or licensee of dwelling place has requisite interest).
17. 362 U.S. at 264.
18. Id at 266-67. In Rakas the Court effectively limited Jones to its facts as to the "legiti-
mately on the premises" standard. "Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable propo-
sition that a person can have a legally sufficient interst in a place other than his home so that the
[Vol. 15:85
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Jones contained an alternative rationale for granting standing to
assert fourth amendment rights. Jones could have had standing had he
only claimed to own or possess the seized property. Under then ex-
isting law, however, this might well have put Jones in a worse posi-
tion.' 9 He could testify at the suppression hearing that the narcotics
belonged to him. In so doing, he would assert a property interest suffi-
cient for standing under the then existing law. Assuming the search or
seizure was found improper, the evidence would be suppressed. The
narcotics would no longer be necessary, however, because Jones would
have already admitted possession, the major element of the offense. To
avoid this dilemma the Court provided for automatic standing in such
cases. "The possession on the basis of which petitioner is to be and was
convicted suffices to give him standing under any fair and rational con-
ception ... ."Io Under this second rationale, a defendant need not
claim a possessory interest in the illegally seized item to raise the fourth
amendment question if his possession was a substantive element of the
offense charged.
Although Jones set forth these two new rationales for standing, it
did not reject the two traditional bases. The owner or possessor of the
seized property still had standing to raise the issue, as did the owner of
the searched premises.2 ' Thus, after Jones, standing to contest the va-
lidity of a search or seizure could be demonstrated in any one of four
ways. If the party was (1) the owner of the searched premises, (2) legiti-
mately on the premises at the time of the search, (3) the owner or pos-
sessor of the seized property, or (4) charged with a crime, at least one
element of which was possession of the seized property, then standing
would exist.22
Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable government intrusion into that place." 439
U.S. at 142. See notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text.
19. To a certain extent, the dilemma no longer exists. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968), the Supreme Court held that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to
suppress, his testimony may not be used thereafter against him at trial on the issue of guilt, unless
he makes no objection. Id. at 389-94. The holding in Simmons, however, would not prevent the
prosecution from using the defendant's suppression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes
at trial. See People v. Sturgis, 58 II. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974). See also United States v.
Kahn, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (the protective shield of Simmons is not a license for false representa-
tions). Cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement obtained in violation of defend-
ant's Miranda rights may be used against him for impeachment purposes).
20. 362 U.S. at 264.
21. Either of these two interests would meet the traditional standing requirements the Court
gave. Id at 261.
22. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 225-27, 229 (1972). In Brown the defendants
had been convicted on charges relating to transportation of stolen goods in interstate commerce.
Part of the evidence used to convict them resulted from a search of a co-conspirator's place of
1979]
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Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Jones did not abandon the tradi-
tional proposition 3 that fourth amendment rights are personal in na-
ture and may not be asserted vicariously.
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure" one must have been a victim of the search
or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as dis-
tinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the
use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or
seizure directed at someone else.24
The four enumerated ways of achieving standing were guidelines in
determining who was a victim of a search or seizure.
B. Grafting on the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy Standard
In Mancusi v. DeForte,25 the Court initiated a shift from a rigid
application of the Jones standard of legitimate presence. Mancusi fol-
lowed closely in time the landmark fourth amendment decision of Katz
v. United States.26 Although the Court recognized in Mancusi that the
defendant clearly had standing under the "legitimately on the prem-
ises" test of Jones, it went on to apply the "reasonable expectation of
business made under a defective warrant. None of the defendants were present at the time of the
search. The defendants, other than the store owner, asserted no interest in the premises searched
or the items seized, but sought to achieve standing to contest the unlawful search and seizure on
the automatic standing ground of Jones. The Supreme Court refused automatic standing on the
basis that the defendants were not charged with an offense that had as an essential element posses-
sion of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure. Id at 229.
23. See, e.g., id. at 230; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). For a discus-
sion of Alderman see notes 47-53 infra and accompanying text.
24. 362 U.S. at 261. The language quoted by Justice Frankfurter is from Rule 41(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the federal statutory exclusionary rule at the time. The
exclusionary rule has since been given constitutional status in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Although Jones involved an interpretation of Rule 41(e), the decision is commonly recognized
and accepted as laying the parameters of the constitutional standing requirement in fourth amend-
ment cases. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 n.6 (1969). See also United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-49 n.6 (1974).
25. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz government agents electronically eavesdropped on a public
telephone booth. Katz was overheard placing gambling bets in violation of federal law. The
Supreme Court held that Katz 'justifiably relied" on privacy while using the phone booth thus
indicating that privacy was at the heart of the interests protected by the fourth amendment. Id at
353. As interpreted by subsequent decisions, Katz stands for the proposition that the fourth
amendment "protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
An in-depth analysis of Katz and its ramifications for fourth amendment jurisprudence is
beyond the scope of this note. Myriad commentaries have been written on Katz. E.g., Kitch,
Katz v. United States: The Limits ofthe Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133, LAFAvE,
supra note 10, in his three volumes is particularly good in relating Katz to the whole of the fourth
amendment.
6
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privacy" test of Katz to the issue of standing.27
Frank DeForte, a local teamsters' union official, was convicted by
the use of evidence seized by police without a warrant from a union
office shared by DeForte and several other union officials.28 DeForte,
present in the office at the time of the search, protested the government
action at his trial on charges of conspiracy, coercion, and extortion.2 9
DeForte's claim of fourth amendment violation was rejected through-
out his direct state appeal of the conviction and at the first stage of
federal habeas corpus review.30 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit granted the writ based on DeForte's fourth amendment claim.
The Supreme Court, specifically addressing the issue of DeForte's
standing to assert the violation of his rights, overturned the conviction
and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision granting habeas corpus.
While the Court found the standing inquiry properly to be "whether
the area [searched] was one in which there was a reasonable expecta-
tion of freedom from governmental intrusion," 32 it emphasized the vi-
tality of the "legitimately on the premises" Jones standard.33 Applying
the Katz standard in Mancusi, the Supreme Court found that, although
DeForte had little expectation of absolute privacy in the shared office,
he did have a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion by search.34 Having determined that DeForte had standing
to raise the fourth amendment question, the Supreme Court went on to
find the search and seizure unlawful.35
27. 392 U.S. at 368-69.
28. Id at 365.
29. Id
30. The state appeals culminated in a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court which was
denied sub nom. De Grandis v. New York, 375 U.S. 868 (1963). Federal habeas corpus relief was
initially sought in the Western District of New York. 261 F. Supp. 579 (1966).
31. 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. 392 U.S. at 368.
33. Id at n.5.
The petitioner contends that this holding was not intended to have general applica-
tion, but that it was devised solely to solve the particular dilemma presented in Jones.
that of a defendant who was charged with a possessory offense and consequently might
have to concede his guilt in order to establish standing in the usual way. However, this
limited reading of Jones overlooks the fact that in Jones standing was held to exist on
two distinct grounds: "(1) [The circumstance that] possession both convicts and confers
standing, eliminates any necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the prem-
ises searched or the property seized .... (2) Even were this not aprosecution turning on
illicit possession, the legally requisite interest in the premises was here satisfied ....
Thus, the second branch of the holding, with which we are here concerned, was explicitly
stated to be of general effect.
Id (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
34. Id at 369-70.
35. Id at 370-72.
19791
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Commentators perceived that the Court's opinion in Mancusi indi-
cated a shift in focus as to standing. 6 Nevertheless, legitimate presence
on the premises searched continued to be mentioned, at least as a rele-
vant factor to the issue of standing, in both commentary37 and later
Supreme Court cases.38
IV. CONTENTIONS OF RAKAS AND KING
Rakas and King, relying heavily on the standing doctrine enunci-
ated in Jones, offered two bases for their standing to contest the search
and seizure. They sought a broadening of the Jones rule to allow a
criminal defendant to gain standing if the contested search was "di-
rected at" him, that is, if he was the "target" of the search and seizure.3 9
In the alternative they urged the Supreme Court to decide the issue of
standing on the basis of the Jones "legitimate presence" standard.4 °
V. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Court in Rakas v. Illinois divided five to four. Justice Rehn-
quist wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun joined. Justice Powell also
wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined in it by the Chief
Justice. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in the dissent
of Justice White.
A. Rejection of the Target Standard
The essence of the petitioners' "directed at" or "target" theory of
standing was derived from the language of the Jones opinion: "[O]ne
must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the
search was directed."41 Rakas and King argued that they were the ac-
36. Eg., 3 LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 11.3, at 543-45; Gutterman, "4 Person Aggrieved'"
Standing to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence in Transition, 23 EMoRY L.J. 111, 116-17 (1974);
White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 345 (1970).
37. See, eg., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 361
(1973); Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge
Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REv. 1, 36 (1975); Trager & Lobenfeld, Law of Standing Under
the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 421, 446-48 (1975).
38. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 227 n.2 (1973); Combs v. United States,
408 U.S. 224 n.3 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968).
39. 439 U.S. at 132; Brief for Petitioners at 14-17.
40. Brief for Petitioners at 8-14.
41. 362 U.S. at 261 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 15:85
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tual targets of the search. The police were hunting two men who
shortly before had committed an armed robbery. There was no reason
to suspect the involvement of other people.42 The car was stopped and
searched to determine if Rakas and King were the robbers. Therefore,
they were the targets against whom the search was directed. As such,
under this "target theory," they argued they should have standing to
contest the search.
This directed at or target theory of standing had never expressly
been held an independent basis for standing by the Supreme Court, but
the language had continued to appear after Jones.43 While case law
support for this theory was sparse, legal commentators had endorsed
it.44 All nine members of the Court in Rakas rejected the target theory
of standing in search and seizure matters.4  Both the majority and the
dissent cited Alderman v. United States46 as dispositive of "target"
standing.
In Alderman, three co-conspirators attempted to suppress evidence
42. Brief for Petitioners at 15. Arguably, under this "target" theory if the robbery had in-
volved women robbers the search could have been directed at only the two women in the car
stopped.
43. "[T]here can be no question of the petitioner's standing to challenge the lawfulness of the
search. He was the 'one against whom the search was directed,' Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 261. ... Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.l 1(1968). A case prior to Jones
had also indicated a possibility of target standing.
The Government argues, however, that the search did not invade respondent's pri-
vacy and that he, therefore, lacked the necessary standing to suppress the evidence
seized .... We do not believe the events are so easily isolable. Rather they are bound
together by one sole purpose-to locate and seize the narcotics of respondent. The
search and seizure are, therefore, incapable of being untied. To hold that this search and
seizure were lawful as to the respondent would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn
a principle which was designed to protect a fundamental right.
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951). The Rakas majority dismissed both Bumper and
Jeffers as not indicative of an independent target theory of standing because both claimants had
substantial possessory interests in the premises searched and articles seized. 439 U.S. at 135-36.
In Bumper the search was of the house where Bumper lived with relatives and the seizure was of a
rifle used by all members of the household. 391 U.S. at 548 n.ll. In Jeffers the search was of the
defendant's aunt's apartment to which he had a key and her permission to use the room at will.
The items seized were narcotics placed there apparently by the defendant. 342 U.S. at 50.
44. Eg., White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
333, 349-56 (1970); GEO. L.J. 1187, 1193-95 (1976). These and other commentators have argued
that the target rule would be most consistent with the purposes of the exclusionary rule, in that
unlawful police conduct is best deterred when the purpose of that conduct is thwarted. The argu-
ment is that, if an unlawful search is directed at getting evidence against an individual, to allow
that person to assert the fourth amendment guarantee will make such searches fruitless for the
police.
45. Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, dealt with the target theory basis of standing in part
II A of his opinion. 439 U.S. at 132-38. Justice White in his dissent admitted agreement with the
majority on this point. Id at 156 n.l.
46. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Justice White, who wrote the dissent in Rakas, wrote the Alderman
opinion.
9
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gained by illegal electronic surveillance of one co-conspirator's place of
business.47 They urged the Court to adopt a rule such that if evidence
was inadmissible against one co-conspirator because of illegal search
or seizure, it would be inadmissible against other co-conspirators. This
result was urged regardless of whether the other co-conspirators had
had their fourth amendment rights violated.48 The Alderman Court re-
jected this contention, characterizing it as an overly expansive reading
of the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule.49 Quoting the
same language Rakas and King would later offer in support of their
target theory of standing,50 the Alderman Court held that "suppression
of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully
urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not
by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evi-
dence. 51 In addition, the Court denied the existence of any independ-
ent constitutional right to exclude relevant evidence because it was
seized from another in violation of the fourth amendment.5 2 Thus, the
Alderman Court adhered to the general rule that fourth amendment
rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted.5 3  The
Supreme Court in Rakas found that the language of Alderman implic-
itly rejected any target theory of standing.54 A target theory would al-
low vicarious assertion of fourth amendment rights.5 5
Perhaps the simplest explanation offered by the Rakas majority to
dismiss target standing was a brief analysis of the language in Jones
47. Id at 167-70.
48. Id at 171.
49. Id "This expansive reading of the fourth amendment and of the exclusionary rule fash-
ioned to enforce it is admittedly inconsistent with prior cases and we reject it." Id.
50. 394 U.S. at 173. The language involved is that of Jones.
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" one
must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was di-
rected, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence
gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.
362 U.S. at 261.
51. 394 U.S. at 171-73.
52. Id at 174.
53. Id See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 366 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
54. 439 U.S. at 136.
The [Alderman Court]. . .left no doubt that it rejected this theory by holding that
persons who were not parties to unlawfully overheard conversations or who did not own
the premises on which such conversations took place did not have standing to contend
the legality of the surveillance, regardless of whether or not they were the "targets" of the
surveillance.
55. Id at 133-38.
[Vol. 15:85
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from which the petitioners derived their theory. Had the Jones Court
intended the language "one against whom the search was directed" to
import the meaning urged by Rakas and King, neither of its alternative
holdings would have been necessary.56 Both the "automatic" standing
ground and the "legitimately on the premises" ground would have
been unnecessary as Jones was clearly the target of the search, one
against whom it was directed. 57 Justice Rehnquist argued that the "di-
rected at" language must therefore have only been meant "as a paren-
thetical equivalent of the previous phrase 'a victim of a search or
seizure.' "58 This was, therefore, a second reason for not interpreting
the Jones language in a way abrogating the rule against vicarious asser-
tion of fourth amendment rights.
The specter of a runaway exclusionary rule looms large in the re-
jection of the target standard by the JRakas Court. In the analysis of the
Court, not only would the target theory allow vicarious assertion of
fourth amendment rights, it also would lack merit in terms of social
policy. The majority adopted the rationale earlier espoused by Justice
Harlan in Alderman in dismissing arguments that the target theory was
necessary for full recognition of fourth amendment rights.59 Of pri-
mary concern to the Court was the exclusion of more reliable and rele-
vant evidence, were these rights to be extended to a larger class of
persons than previously allowed.60 Despite the strong policy of police
deterrence underlying the exclusionary rule, the majority noted that it
had never been "held that unlawfully seized evidence was inadmissible
56. 362 U.S. at 261.
57. 439 U.S. at 135. Jones was specifically named in the search warrant which federal agents
were executing when they discovered narcotics. 362 U.S. at 267-68 n.2.
58. 439 U.S. at 135.
59. Id at 136-38. Justice Fortas, in his opinion in Alderman, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, had explicitly argued that the fourth amendment guarantee was directed against un-
reasonable governmental searches and seizures in general, and therefore, anyone should be able to
raise the guarantee.
The Fourth Amendment, unlike the Fifth, is couched in terms of a guarantee that the
Government will not engage in unreasonable searches and seizures. It is a general prohi-
bition, a fundamental part of the constitutional compact, the observance of which is
essential to the welfare of all persons. Accordingly, commentators have urged that the
necessary implication of the Fourth Amendment is that any defendant against whom
illegally acquired evidence is offered, whether or not it was obtained in violation of his
right to privacy, may have the evidence excluded. It is also contended that this is the
only means to secure the observance of the Fourth Amendment.
394 U.S. at 205-06 (footnotes omitted).
While the Alderman majority did not directly address Justice Fortas's point, Justice Harlan in
his concurrence did. In the analysis of Justice Harlan, any marginal increase in fourth amend-
ment protection offered by such a broadened approach would be more than offset by substantial
difficulties in the administration of such a rule. Id at 188-89 n.l.
60. 439 U.S. at 137-38.
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in all proceedings or against all persons."' 61 Instead, according to the
majority, the rule has consistently been applied only where its remedial
objectives are best served.62 Weighing what it felt to be a minimal ad-
ditional deterrent effect against the correlative societal costs of exclud-
ing more relevant evidence, the majority could not justify a target
theory of standing.63
As noted by Justice White's dissent, the majority's fear of the ex-
panded availability of the exclusionary rule is misplaced when the issue
is not of remedy, but of standing to assert constitutional rights.64 If the
practical impact of the exclusionary rule was the underlying concern of
the majority, the question of the rule's continuing validity should have
been addressed directly, and the issue should not have been side-
stepped through the device of standing.65
B. Demise of the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing
In reaffirming the principle that fourth amendment rights cannot
be asserted vicariously, the majority questioned the utility of treating
the standing doctrine as a concept separate and distinct from the merits
of a fourth amendment claim.66 Discarding the idea that the concept of
standing was any broader than the substantive right itself, the majority
concluded that "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of
a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather
than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept
of standing. 67
Because the new approach requires the same inquiry as the sub-
61. Id at 134 n.3.
62. Id
63. Id at 136-38.
64. Id at 156 (White, J., dissenting).
65. Id See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally Comment, Impending "Frontal Assault" on the Citadel: The Supreme Court's Readiness to
Modify the Strict Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment to a Good Faith Standard, 12 TULSA
L.J. 337 (1976).
The Rakas Court concerned itself with the effect of exclusion of additional relevant and relia-
ble evidence under the exclusionary rule. This approach seems backwards: to determine the issue
of standing to raise fourth amendment rights, one looks not to those rights but to the effects of the
judicially imposed remedy for violation of those rights. Justice White criticized the majority for
using this same approach in its analysis of the legitimate expectation of privacy ground for stand-
ing. Id at 437. Such criticism seems just as appropriate in this context, regardless of the merit of
the Court's argument as to the vicarious assertion of these rights.
66. 439 U.S. at 138-40. See also notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text (discussion of
Alderman).
67. Id at 139. The Court would obviate any separate doctrine of standing and would ad-
dress each challenge to search or seizure on its merits.
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stantive question of violation of fourth amendment rights, the majority
intimated that the abolition of the initial standing inquiry would "pro-
duce no additional situations in which evidence must be excluded." '68
The Court also claimed that despite its prior fourth amendment cases
being analytically imprecise, none of them "would have come out dif-
ferently" under the new formula.69
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Rakas failed to address
this change in methodology. Perhaps that is a tacit admission that be-
cause fourth amendment rights can only be asserted by him whose
rights were violated, the separate standing question was redundant.
Regardless of the reason for this silence, it is clear that there is, after
Rakas, no separate standing inquiry when fourth amendment claims
are made.
C. Rejection of the Legitimate Presence Standard of Jones
In rejecting standing in fourth amendment analysis as a separate
juridical concept, the majority may have made a mere change in no-
menclature. A redundant preliminary step would be subsumed in the
substantive question of whether fourth amendment rights were vio-
lated. Yet, the majority of five rejected the legitimate presence stan-
dard which specifically had been announced in Jones.7" Although the
Court had indicated earlier that a strict application of the legitimate
presence standard might not be the whole of the inquiry,7 that stan-
dard had not specifically been repudiated. Aside from the new Rakas
methodology, there appears to be a new substantive standard. While
the Court in Rakas was unanimous in rejecting the target theory,72 the
issue of the legitimate presence standard split the Court.
The basis of the majority's rejection of the Jones legitimate pres-
ence standard stemmed from the substantive standard of fourth
amendment rights set out in Katz v. United States.73 Recognizing that
the core of the interests protected by the fourth amendment was pri-
68. Id
69. Id But see notes 117-47 infra and accompanying text.
70. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
71. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1967). See notes 25-38 supra and accompanying
text.
72. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
73. 389 U.S. 347. In the majority opinion written by Justice Stewart, the language used was
to the effect that Katz had 'justifiably relied" on privacy while using a telephone booth. Id at
353. Subsequent decisions have referred to the language of Justice Harlan's concurrence which
referred to "expectation of privacy." Id at 361.
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vacy, the Court in Katz held that the fourth amendment protects pri-
vacy upon which we justifiably rely.74 As interpreted by subsequent
decisions Katz stands for the proposition that the fourth amendment
"protects people from unreasonable governmental intrusions into their
legitimate expectations of privacy. 75
The majority in Rakas discarded the idea that standing, in relation
to fourth amendment rights, was any broader than the substantive right
itself.76 Viewed in such a way, the proper inquiry of standing involved
the same analysis as the definition of the scope of the right.77 Hence,
the Katz test was the only standard to apply: did Rakas and King have
legitimate expectations of privacy as passengers in that automobile,
such that their fourth amendment rights were violated by the search or
seizure? 78
Against this backdrop, the legitimate presence criterion announced
in Jones was found by the Rakas Court to be "too broad a gauge for
measurement of fourth amendment rights. 7 9 One could be legiti-
mately on the premises when the premises were searched and yet not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 0 Because under Alderman a
74. Id at 353.
75. Eg., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("capacity to claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment depends. . . upon whether the person. . . has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (defendants had
an expectation ofprivacy in a double-locked footlocker); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752
(197 1) ("our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what expectations of pri-
vacy are constitutionally justifiable' "); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 191 (1969)
("standing should be granted to every person who participates in a conversation he legitimately
expects will remain private-for it is such persons that Katz protects") (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) ("a reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion").
76. 439 U.S. at 138-40. The Court would do away with any separate doctrine ofstanding and
would address each challenge to search or seizure on its merits. See notes 66-69 supra and accom-
panying text.
77. Id. at 139. "The inquiry under either approach is the same. But we think the better
analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate but invariably intertwined concept of
standing." Id (footnote omitted).
78. Id at 143.
Katz . United States... provides guidance in defining the scope of the interest pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. . . . Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon
whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the invaded place.
Id (citations omitted).
79. Id at 142 (footnote omitted).
80. The Court suggested as an example the casual visitor in someone's home who has never
been in a certain part of the house, and would thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in
such part of the house. Id at 142.
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fourth amendment violation may only be raised by a victim of that
illegal search or seizure (measured by the Katz standard),8' legitimate
presence on the premises cannot be the criterion for standing, the ma-
jority reasoned. 2
The Rakas majority limited Jones to its facts.8 3 They concluded
that Jones stood only for "the unremarkable proposition that a person
can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home
so that the fourth amendment protects him from unreasonable govern-
mental intrusion into that place."84 The Jones holding was best ex-
plained, in the opinion of the Rakas Court, by the fact that Jones had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using and
could therefore claim fourth amendment protection.85
While legitimate presence on the searched premises was not to be
the fundamental fourth amendment inquiry, the Rakas Court recog-
nized that it is not irrelevant to one's expectation of privacy.86 The
Court noted that a person's wrongful presence at the scene of a search
would preclude him from successfully objecting to its illegality. 7 As
the Court found the legitimate presence criterion not controlling,8 8 ap-
parently there must be more than legitimate presence when a property
interest in the place searched or objects seized is not asserted.
81. See notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text.
82. See 439 U.S. at 138-40.
83. Id at 143.
[W]e adhere to the view expressed in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinc-
tions developed in property and tort law. . . ought not to control. But the Jones state-
ment that a person only be "legitimately on premises" in order to challenge the validity
of the search of a dwelling place cannot be taken in its full sweep beyond the facts of that
case.
Id (citations omitted).
84. Id at 142.
85. Id at 143.
86. Id at 148.
87. Id at 141 n.9, 143 n.12; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thor-
oughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recog-
nizes as "legitimate." His presence.., is "wrongful"; his expectation is not "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12. But see Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967) (purported
car thief had standing to contest search of the stolen car); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291
(10th Cir. 1965) (claim of possessory interest in stolen car is enough for standing to assert the
fourth amendment protection); Barr v. State, 531 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. 1975) (following the
opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Simpson on similar facts). The federal decisions in Cotton and
Simpson were criticized by the Rakas majority. 439 U.S. at 141 n.9.
88. 439 U.S. at 148.
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D. Application of the Katz Standard
Having decided that the proper inquiry before it was whether or
not Rakas and King had a legitimate expectation of privacy from un-
reasonable government intrusion, the Supreme Court had to apply that
standard. In attempting to define and give substance to the concept of
"legitimate expectation of privacy" the Court initially noted that
[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference
to concepts of real or personal property law or to understand-
ings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the
main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others
• ..and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls prop-
erty will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy by virtue of this right to exclude.8 9
While the majority severely limited the holding of Jones,9" it em-
braced the view enunciated in Jones "that arcane distinctions devel-
oped in property and tort law. . . ought not to control" in determining
the scope of the fourth amendment. 91 Despite the majority's disclaim-
ers, the concept of property rights was significant, if not controlling, in
determining whether Rakas and King had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the automobile in which they were riding. The majority
failed to delineate what constitutes "understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society"9 2 such as would give a privacy interest in the
absence of a property interest.
The legitimate expectation standard compels courts to decide the
degree of social significance sufficient to raise a fourth amendment
claim. Without criteria by which a victim may show that his expecta-
tion of privacy was reasonable or legitimate, however, the determina-
tion by any court is subject to fiat. The Rakas majority gave no such
criteria, short of a property or a possessory interest in the premises
searched or a similar interest in the property seized.93
Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, listed several factors
which might be considered. Whether a person took normal precautions
89. Id at 143-44 n.12.
90. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
91. 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12, 149-50 n.17. In fact, according to the Rakas majority, one's
expectation of privacy need not be based at all "on a common-law interest in real or personal
property, or on the invasion of such an interest." Id at 144 n.12.
92. Id
93. Id at 148-49.
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to maintain his privacy was one factor for consideration.94 Use of the
location by the person was another.95 Historical perceptions of particu-
lar types of governmental intrusions could also be relevant.96 Justice
Powell noted that property rights were also relevant to the determina-
tion as they "reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority
to act as he wishes in certain areas. 97 Having listed all these factors
considered by the Court in past decisions, Justice Powell, without fur-
ther explanation, found none of them applicable to Rakas and King.98
Both Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and the concurrence of
Justice Powell found a lack of the requisite privacy interest. They
based this finding on the separate treatment which automobiles had
received under the fourth amendment. Both Justices noted that dimin-
ished expectations of privacy in automobiles are firmly established in
fourth amendment jurisprudence. 99 Both are correct in that
automobiles have generally been treated differently than other prem-
ises for fourth amendment purposes. '00 Nevertheless, these automobile
94. Id at 152. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11 (items seized had been
placed in a double-locked footlocker); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 352 (shutting out the
uninvited ear by closing the telephone booth door).
95. 439 U.S. at 153. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 257 (privacy interest in
apartment where defendant slept and kept clothes).
96. 439 U.S. at 153. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7-9 (while particular
importance was placed on the home, the fourth amendment was intended to protect fundamental
values not just to protect against specific abuses).
97. 439 U.S. at 153.
98. "The petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights were not abridged here because none of the
factors relied upon by this Court on prior occasions supports petitioners' claim that their alleged
expectation of privacy from government intrusion was reasonable." Id at 153 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
99. Id at 148 (opinion of the Court); id at 153-54 (Powell, J., concurring).
100, See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12. Those purposes for which
automobiles have been treated differently have concerned the reasonableness of a particular type
search in light of all the circumstances at the time. "But this Court has recognized significant
differences between motor vehicles and other property which permit warrantless searches of
automobiles in circumstances in which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other
contexts." Id. "[Olne's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation
are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one's resi-
dence. And the reasonableness of the procedure followed in making these checkpoint stops makes
the resulting intrusion on the interests of the motorist minimal." United States v. Martinez-Fu-
erte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-62 (1976) (citations omitted). "This degree of discretion to search private
automobiles is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. A search, even of an automobile, is a
substantial invasion of privacy." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975). "The conjunc-
tion of these factors [involved in roving automobile searches in border areas] ... persuades me
that under appropriate limiting circumstances there may exist a constitutionally adequate
equivalent of probable cause. ... Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring). "In terms of the circumstances justifying a warrantless search, the Court
has long distinguished between an automobile and a home or office." Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 48 (1970). The automobile distinction has been made to rationalize lesser safeguards than
that of a search warrant based on probable cause when automobiles are involved in a search.
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cases have recognized that some level of legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy exists even there.' 0 ' Reliance on a distinction between cars and
dwelling places, originally made to rationalize exceptions to the search
warrant requirement, is misplaced when determining whether a person
has any legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area. Wher-
ever an individual may be "he is entitled to know that he will remain
free from unreasonable searches and seizures."' 0 2 A person "operating
or travelling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectations
of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to
government regulation."'0 3 Just as an individual does not lose his
fourth amendment rights by stepping from his home onto public side-
walks, °4 he likewise should not be shorn of those rights when he steps
from a sidewalk into an automobile.10 5
Once it is determined that there is some legitimate expectation of
privacy due a passenger in an automobile, the inquiry should focus on
the reasonableness of the search. That the expectation of privacy in an
automobile is different from that in a home should be relevant only to
the issue of the reasonableness of the search under the circumstances.
The majority in Rakas stated that even if Rakas and King had
been guests in a home they would have had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the types of areas searched.
But here petitioners' claim is one which would fail even in an
analogous situation in a dwelling place since they made no
showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy
in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in
which they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an au-
tomobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger
simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of
privacy.'0 6
There is a lesser degree of privacy in an automobile according to this precedent, but this distinc-
tion was never used as grounds for finding no expectation of privacy in an automobile. The
bootstraps which the Rakas Court attempted to use simply do not reach that far.
101. 439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting). See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
12-13.
102. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). As the Katz Court noted, the fourth
amendment protects people, not places. Id at 351.
103. Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1400-01 (1979) (random stop of automobile for li-
cense check is unconstitutional (emphasis supplied). Justice Powell, concurring in Rakas, found it
significant that automobiles were subject to extensive regulation. 439 U.S. at 154 n.2.
104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk by police on public sidewalk is reasonable
under the fourth amendment).
105. See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979).
106. 439 U.S. at 148-49 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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By way of explanation the majority in Rakas offered only an analogy
to a casual visitor in another's house. 10 7 The casual visitor who has
never seen or been permitted to visit the basement of the house, in the
view of the majority, would not be entitled to object to a search of that
basement, if he were in the kitchen at the time of the search. "The...
visitor would have absolutely no interest or legitimate expectation of
privacy in the basement ... 108
Even accepting the premise of the example, that such a visitor
would have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement of the
house, the Court's comparison to a passenger in a motor vehicle over-
looks several important factual differences in the situations. Of pri-
mary importance is the nearness of the space to the individual. Both
the glove compartment and the area underneath a car seat are within
arm's length of a passenger. The house visitor, on the other hand, is
quite likely to be several yards, a flight of steps, and one or two doors
away from the basement. For that same reason-near accessibility-
the glove compartment and the area underneath the seat should be dif-
ferentiated from the trunk of a car. 10 9 A more fitting analogy might be
drawn to a visitor in the kitchen, who seeks to challenge a search of the
kitchen itself, including all the cupboards and drawers accessible to
that visitor. Had there been evidence that the owner of the car had
sought to exclude Rakas and King from the areas under the seat or in
the glove compartment, they might very well have had no expectations
of privacy therein. In the case confronting the Court, however, there
was no evidence that the owner of the car sought to exclude the passen-
gers from either area."' While the compartmentalization of the area of
a search may be useful in some instances, as an aid to analysis of the
privacy interest involved, the compartments which the Court defined
are unrealistic.
The Court in Rakas distinguished the petitioners' claims from
107. Id. at 142.
108. Id.
109. Contra, id at 148-49. Justice Rehnquist offered no explanation but the flat statement to
the contrary.
[T]hey made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove
compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers.
Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger
simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Id
110. While the glove compartment was locked, id at 130, this is an ambiguous gesture and
could be interpreted not as an attempt by the driver to exclude the passengers from that area, but
as an attempt to exclude others. Justice Powell implicitly admitted that the compartment being
locked would heighten the legitimate expectation of privacy. Id at 155 n.4.
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those in the Jones and Katz cases. The "significantly different factual
circumstances"' II1 which created a reasonable expectation of privacy in
Jones, according to the _Rakas majority, were that Jones had a key to
his friend's apartment, kept possessions there, and had complete do-
minion and control over the apartment except as to his friend. The
significant facts in Katz, for the Rakas Court, were that Katz had occu-
pied the phone booth by himself, had closed the phone booth door to
exclude others, and had paid the toll for the call. It was because of
these facts, the ]Rakas Court stated, that Katz and Jones could legiti-
mately expect privacy in the areas which were the subject of the con-
tested search and seizure." 2 The Court found that, because Rakas and
King had made no similar showing of significant facts as to the areas of
the search, they had no legitimate expectation of privacy."t 3
Although any analogy between the situation in Rakas and that in
Jones or Katz would be strained," 4 the existence of Rakas's and King's
claim of legitimate expectation of privacy should not have been thereby
disproved. Search and seizure claims depend heavily upon the specific
facts in each case."' A fact which is significant in one factual pattern
may not be given similar weight in another." 6 Jones and Katz dealt
with factual situations which did not involve the presence of additional
persons or involve an automobile as the area searched. Had the major-
ity attempted to analyze additional cases with fact situations more simi-
lar to that before them, the Rakas result might have been different.
The decision probably would have been more informative as to the
criteria for a legitimate expectation of privacy absent a property inter-
est in the place searched or item seized. There are decisions of the
111. Id at 149.
112. Id
113. Id
114. It is difficult to find in Rakas facts which parallel those that were relied upon to explain
the Jones result. The area searched in Jones was a dwelling, not a vehicle. Except for the similar-
ity between the closing of the car doors by Rakas and King to exclude others and the closing of the
telephone booth door by the defendant in Katz, the facts in Katz are equally lacking in similar
circumstances.
115. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393 (1968); United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
116. For example, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), three defendants were
charged with possession of drugs with intent to distribute. Each defendant moved before trial to
suppress the evidence derived from the government's search and seizure of a double-locked foot-
locker which had been put in the trunk of one defendant's automobile by the other two defen-
dants. It appeared from the facts that only one of the defendants had a key to the footlocker. Id
at 4. Apparently this fact, possession of a key to the locked area searched, highly significant in
Jones to show the defendant's control of an apartment, was thought inconsequential in Chadwick.
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Court factually closer to the Rakas situation which should have figured
into the reasoning in the Rakas decision.
One case in particular should have troubled the Rakas majority.
It was glossed over.'" 7 In 1ios v. United States,"8 Rios was the sole
passenger in a taxicab. As the cab stopped at a traffic light, two police
officers, who had been following the cab, forced him out of it. The
officers observed Rios drop a package to the floor of the cab.119 They
recognized it as a package of narcotics. This package was subsequently
used to convict Rios of a federal narcotics law violation. 2° Rios's con-
viction was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court because the
district court, in admitting the evidence, had relied on the "silver plat-
ter" doctrine which had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Elkins
v. United States'22 after Rios's trial. Finding Elkins applicable to the
facts before it, the Supreme Court specifically limited the question on
remand to an inquiry into the reasonableness of the search.2 3 Implicit
in the Rios decision was the determination by the Supreme Court that
Rios had some expectation of privacy as a passenger in a taxi, even
when the package which he dropped was in plain view, else he could
not have asserted the fourth amendment challenge.
The Court in Rakas discounted Rios as not controlling. "The
question of Rios' right to contest the search was not presented to or
addressed by the Court and the property seized appears to have be-
longed to Rios."' 24 This position is untenable for four reasons.
First, the Rios Court held that Elkins v. United States'25 stood for
the proposition that "evidence seized in an unreasonable search by
state officials is to be excluded from a federal criminal trial upon the
117. 439 U.S. at 149 n.16.
118. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
119. Id at 255-57.
120. Id at 254.
121. The "silver platter" doctrine permitted evidence, illegally seized by state officials, to be
used in federal criminal trials if the federal officials had not participated in the illegal act. See
generally Comment, Polishing the Tarnished Silver Platter Doctrine: The Effect ofJanis v. United
States on Intersovereign Fourth Amendment Violations, 12 TULSA L.J. 357 (1976). The phrase "sil-
ver platter" originated in the opinion of Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 n.2 (1960).
122. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
123. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. at 255. "The only questions that remains in this case
therefore is whether the Los Angeles officers obtained the package of heroin 'during a search
which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.'" Id at 255.
124. 439 U.S. at 149 n.16.
125. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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timely objection of a defendant who has standing to complai.I'26 By
holding Elkins applicable and by narrowing the issue on remand to
whether or not the search came under one of the exceptions to the war-
rant requirement of the fourth amendment, the Rios Court necessarily
decided the question of Rios's standing to assert the fourth amendment
claim.
Second, under the new methodology set forth in Rakas for evalu-
ating fourth amendment claims, the issue of standing is totally sub-
sumed by the substantive question of whether or not a defendant has a
legitimate expectation of privacy. 27 From this proposition of Rakas,
and the statement by the Court that no prior decisions would be de-
cided with different results under the new rule,'2 8 it follows that every
prior search and seizure case decided on its merits is controlling prece-
dent for the legitimate expectation of privacy issue. In A/os the Court
implicitly reached that substantive question of legitimate expectation of
privacy; only the reasonableness of the search remained at issue.1 29
Rios is therefore controlling precedent for the proposition that a taxi
passenger may have a legitimate expectation of privacy while riding in
a cab.' 30
Third, the decision in Katz specifically relied upon Rios to support
the proposition that a person in a phone booth has a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in that area. 131 Katz embraced the holding in A/os
while announcing the new standard for fourth amendment protected
interests. The passenger in the taxicab in Rios must therefore have had
a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Finally, the Court has decided cases in which the specific issue of
standing was not addressed, and then later, cited that same case in a
subsequent decision as support for resolution of the standing issue
before it.132 Thus, Rios should not have been distinguished simply be-
126. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added).
127. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
128. 439 U.S. at 139. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
129. 364 U.S. at 262. All that remained in Rios after the Supreme Court decision was an
inquiry to resolve conflicting factual testimony and so the case was remanded.
130. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1968), where the Court recognized this
proposition. "No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment."
Id
131. Id
132. See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920)). Seealso the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,374
(1968), where he acknowledged this defect. It is interesting to note that the decision in Katz did
[Vol. 15:85
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss1/6
1979] RA4KAS v. ILLINOIS
cause the issue of standing was not in name addressed therein.
As an additional factual basis for distinguishing the Rios opinion,
the Rakas majority relied upon the appearance that the defendant in
Rios owned the narcotics which were found on the floor of the taxi.1 33
This appearance was never mentioned in the Rios Court's decision.
Assuming that such an appearance would somehow be important, it
would seem there was that same appearance as to the rifle and Rakas
and King. The prosecutor for the State of Illinois certainly attempted
to convey that appearance by introducing the rifle into evidence.
Also significant to the majority in Rakas was the fact that "Rios
had hired the cab and occupied the rear passenger section." 34 Perhaps
this was seen as important because to some extent it paralleled the ap-
parent leasing of the phone booth by the defendant in Katz,135 but it is
left to imagination whether a different result would have obtained had
the Rakas defendants paid or promised to pay for their ride.' 36 Why
this factor should be at all significant in fourth amendment jurispru-
dence is a mystery, unless of course, the majority in Rakas was focus-
ing on some sort of property interest in the taxi purchased by Rios.
This the majority staunchly denied. 37
not mention the issue of standing, but rather focused on substantive fourth amendment law. This
point, however, did not deter the majority in Rakas from relying on Katz extensively.
133. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149 n.16. Clearly there was an appearance in Rakas that the
defendants owned or possessed the rifle and shells. Undoubtedly this was the impression the State
of Illinois attempted to convey to the jury in its prosecution of the defendants.
134. Id
135. Id at 149.
136. See 439 U.S. at 167 (White, J., dissenting). "Why should Fourth Amendment rights be
present when one pays a cabdriver for a ride but be absent when one is given a ride by a friend?"
Id
137. Id at 149-50 n.17.
For reasons which they do not explain, our dissenting Brethren repeatedly criticize
our "holding" that unless one has a common-law property interest in the premises
searched, one cannot object to the search. We have rendered no such "holding," how-
ever. . . .In a similar vein, the dissenters repeatedly state or imply that we now "hold"
that a passenger lawfully in an automobile "may not invoke the exclusionary rule and
challenge a search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a possessory interest
in it .... The case before us involves the search of and seizure of property from the
glove compartment and area under the seat of a car in which petitioners were riding as
passengers. Petitioners claimed only that they were "legitimately on the premises" and
did not claim that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the car
which were searched.
Id Surely the Court was not saying it was refusing the requested relief because Rakas and King
failed to use the proper phraseology in their petition. Nor was the Court failing to reach the
constitutional issue of whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy for a passenger in the
areas underneath the car seat or in the glove compartment. "Mhese are areas in which a pas-
senger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at
148-49. What then might be an area in an automobile in which a passenger qua passenger would
have a legitimate expectation of privacy? Other areas in the vehicle, such as on the seats or the
23
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Assuming that Rios should have been controlling precedent as to
the issue of any legitimate expectation of privacy, the relationship of
the two fact situations needs examination. Any distinction between a
passenger in a taxicab and one in a private vehicle with friends must be
based on a comparison of the privacy expected in each.13  Surely, one
would expect greater privacy in the private automobile. The taxicab
passenger shares the interior of the automobile not with friends, but
with a stranger. If privacy is the crucial inquiry, it is difficult to under-
stand how a taxicab passenger acquires a greater, or more legitimate,
expectation of privacy when he pays for a ride than does the guest
when he accepts a ride in a friend's vehicle. If the reasons offered by
Justice Powell139 for the distinction between privacy in automobiles
and in other places are also to be used as criteria for evaluating the
legitimacy of that privacy, no useful distinctions can be drawn between
taxicabs and private automobiles as the Court tried to do. Both types
of vehicles operate on public streets and are serviced and parked in
public areas. The interiors of both are generally highly visible.140 The
private vehicle is subject to less or equal regulation and inspection.
The majority wholly failed to explain why there was a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in Rios, but not in Rakas.
A second case mentioned by the dissent, but ignored by the major-
ity, involved a factual situation almost identical to that in Rakas. In
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., ' decided after Katz, the police
dashboard, would seem to be areas of less privacy than under the seat or in the glove compartment
because these other areas are exposed to the view of any passerby who happens to look into the
vehicle. The Rakas majority would also find no passenger privacy interest in the trunk of the
vehicle. Id Where then can a mere passenger have a legitimate expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion into the car in which he is riding? Absent the property interest in the
vehicle or the item seized, which the Rakas Court claims is not necessary, it appears that the mere
passenger can demand reasonable governmental action only as to search of his person. Id at 154
n.2. See note 159 infra.
138. This stems from the Court's recognition that the protection of privacy is at the core of the
fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (plurality).
139. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 154 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). "There are sound reasons
for this distinction: Automobiles operate on public streets; they are serviced in public places; they
stop frequently; they are usually parked in public places; their interiors are highly visible; and they
are subject to extensive regulation and inspection." Id
140. d Justice Powell noted that one of the reasons there was no expectation of privacy as to
the rifle under the seat was that it could have slipped into view in the event of an accident or
sudden stop. Id at 439 n.4. Yet, in Rios there was a legitimate expectation of privacy in the floor
of the back seat of the taxi, where at all times objects would be subject to view by someone stand-
ing outside the car. 364 U.S. at 256.
141. 391 U.S. 216 (1968). At the time of the Dyke decision the Court was composed of Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Fortas, Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Marshall, White, and Stew-
art. The entire Dyke Court agreed that evidence of the unlawful search was improperly admitted
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stopped a car which resembled one involved in a shooting incident ear-
lier that evening. All three of the occupants of the car were arrested
and taken to jail. The car was parked outside the jail. While the three
men were inside the jail, several officers, without warrant or consent,
searched the car. They found an air rifle under the front seat which
was later connected with the shooting. Over the timely objections of
the three defendants, evidence of the air rifle was admitted in their joint
trial. All three defendants were convicted.142
The Supreme Court, addressing the fourth amendment violation
asserted by the petitioners in Dyke, found the warrantless search of the
car not justified by any exception to the general warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment. 43 The search was therefore unreasonable
under the fourth amendment and the fruits of that search had to be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule. The conviction of each peti-
tioner was reversed by the Court" 44
Although the issue of standing was nowhere addressed in Justice
White's opinion for the Court, by directly deciding the merits of the
fourth amendment claim, the Court implicitly decided that all three
occupants of the car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
car.14 5 Justice White in his Rakas dissent interpreted the Dyke deci-
sion's silence as to standing as representing an assumption by the Court
prior to Rakas that there was no question as to a passenger's legitimate
expectation of privacy in an automobile."4 With the Katz decision
handed down only five months earlier, 47 it seems beyond question that
the Dyke Court must have decided that the Katz legitimate expectation
of privacy standard was met by all three of the car occupants. Yet,
both the opinion of the Court in Rakas and Justice Powell's concur-
rence fail to even mention the Dyke case, where the area searched was
at trial. Id. At the time of the Rakas decision, Warren had been replaced by Burger as Chief
Justice; Justices Fortas, Black, Douglas, and Harlan had been replaced by Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Stevens, and Rehnquist. Of these new members, only Justice Stevens dissented in Rakas,
joining Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan, three who also dissented in Dyke. It is interesting
to note that Justice Stewart, who specifically concurred in Dyke, id. at 222, aligned himself on the
opposite side with the Rakas majority on facts quite similar to those in Dyke. 439 U.S. 128.
142. Id at 219. Justice White, writing for the majority, did not specify in his statement of the
facts whether the owner of the car was driving the vehicle at the time it was stopped. Similarly,
the Court did not mention which defendant owned the gun.
143. Id at 221-22.
144. Id at 222.
145. Id See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
146. 439 U.S. at 158-59.
147. Katz v. United States was decided December 18, 1967. 389 U.S. 347. Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co. was decided May 20, 1968. 391 U.S. 216.
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the same and where mere passengers asserted a fourth amendment
claim.
Aside from the Dyke decision, there is additional case support for
the proposition that, even though a person shares an area with others
and does not own that place or otherwise have a right to exclude those
others, he may, nevertheless, have a legitimate expectation of privacy
from unreasonable governmental intrusion. In Mancusi v. DeForte,'48
perhaps the first case to intimate a shift in the standing requirement, 14 9
DeForte shared the premises with others and did not have the right to
exclude them. The office searched was shared by DeForte with others
who worked there. 5
The Supreme Court found these factors not detrimental to the pri-
vacy interest asserted by DeForte in determining the issue of his stand-
ing to assert the fourth amendment claim.
It seems to us that the situation was not fundamentally
changed because DeForte shared an office with other union
officers. DeForte still could reasonably have expected that
only those persons and their personal or business guests
would enter the office, and that records would not be touched
except with their permission or that of union higher-ups....
It is, of course, irrelevant that the Union or some of its officals
might validly have consented to a search of the area where the
records were kept, regardless of DeForte's wishes, for it is not
claimed that any such consent was given, either expressly or
by implication.151
So too, in the context of Rakas, it should have been irrelevant that the
driver-owner of the car could have consented to a search. So too, it
should have been irrelevant that the areas in the glove compartment
and under the seat were accessible to others in the car.
The dissenting Justices credited the inability of the Rakas majority
to explain the holding that a passenger in a private automobile has no
legitimate expectation of privacy to a return to the property rights con-
ception 15 2 of the fourth amendment. 53 Jones and Katz had specifically
148. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
149. See notes 25-38 supra and accompanying text.
150. 392 U.S. at 365.
151. Id at 369-70.
152. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), was the leading case in this view of
fourth amendment guarantees. Under this view, the fourth amendment was inapplicable absent a
trespass on property rights. id at 466.
153. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 164-65.
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repudiated such a limited approach.' While it rejected the "legiti-
mate presence" standard of Jones as overbroad,' 55 the .Rakas Court
failed to explain why presence in a private place with the owner's per-
mission is insufficient to meet the Katz standard. As the dissent
pointed out,' 56 it is difficult to conceive how, under the majority opin-
ion, a legitimate expectation of privacy may be shown, short of a tradi-
tional property interest. The Court stated that the legitimacy of privacy
expectations in law "must have a source outside of the Fourth Amend-
ment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."' 57
The criteria for a property interest are fairly concrete, and, up until this
decision, at least one indicium of the understanding accepted by society
was on solid ground. Jones and its progeny established the legitimate
presence test as a means of addressing the question of what privacy
interests were accepted by society. In Rakas, the Court threw out the
legitimate presence on the premises standard. In its place it left noth-
ing except the bare words of the Katz rationale.
Past decisions clearly intimated that there was some level of pri-
vacy in an automobile. 58 That alone should be enough to pass the
Katz standard of legitimate expectation of privacy. As long as there is
some legitimate expectation of privacy, a person is, it would seem, a
"victim" of the search. Once some legitimate expectation is found, the
question then should turn to the quality of the search. Was it reason-
able? Perhaps the search in Rakas was reasonable under the fourth
amendment. The issue was never resolved in Rakas because, no matter
how unreasonable the search, passengers in the position of Rakas and
King have no fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.159
It is true that the Court asserts that it is not limiting the Fourth Amendment bar
against unreasonable searches to the protection of property rights, but in reality it is
doing exactly that. Petitioners were in a private place with the permission of the owner,
but the Court states that that is not sufficient to establish entitlement to a legitimate
expectation of privacy. But if that is not sufficient, what would be? We are not told, and
it is hard to imagine anything short of a property interest that would satisfy the majority.
Id (citation omitted). The Court made numerous references to the failure of Rakas and King to
assert a property interest in the rifle. Id at 130, 131 n.1, 148.
154. See notes 15-18 & 26 supra and accompanying text. See also O'Brien, Reasonable Expec-
tations ofPrivacy: Principles and Policies of Fourth Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 662, 711 (1978).
155. See notes 70-88 supra and accompanying text.
156. 439 U.S. at 164-65 (White, J., dissenting).
157. Id at 143-44 n.12.
158. See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
159. The Rakas Court, or at least Justice Powell in his concurrence, would allow the passenger
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VI. CONCLUSION
Standing no longer is an inquiry distinctly separate from the sub-
stantive question of violation of the fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Legitimate presence on the
premises searched at the time of the search does not, of itself, give that
person standing to assert the unlawful search, regardless of how unrea-
sonable the search is. Absent a property interest in the premises
searched or the objects seized, one who would seek to contest a search
must thread the constricting eye of the needle of legitimate expectation
of privacy. The Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois offered few sugges-
tions as to how this expectation might be proved. Even more dis-
turbing than the lack of suggestions, is the fact that the Rakas holding
is contrary to past decisions of the Court dealing with the privacy of
those in automobiles. Apparently after Rakas, the passenger in a pri-
vate car has no right to demand reasonable government action as to
search of the vehicle in which he is riding.
Jefferson Davis Sellers
a legitimate expectation of privacy as to his person. "The rationale of the automobile distinction
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